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Abstract
This paper o¤ers a simple but rich framework to study communication subject to var-
ious constraints such as anonymity requirements, equal treatment of multiple agents,
overcondence of an expert, and garbling, by extending the cheap talk model of Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982). Common to these seemingly distinct types of constraints in
communication is that the action by a decision maker is less sensitive to a message
than without such constraints. Reduced sensitivity can alter the structure of informa-
tive equilibria dramatically, and leads to a type of informational distortion, termed
incentives to exaggerate, which di¤ers qualitatively from the well-known incentives to
overstate/understate. We demonstrate that the two di¤erent types of distortion may
partly o¤set each other, so the introduction of the constraints may be benecial when
the level of conict between communicating parties is large. Our model can also be
applied to study communication in public good provision where equal treatment is
often implicitly assumed.
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1 Introduction
A great deal of information in society is communicated anonymously. In rms or schools,
junior members often communicate with senior members (management, teachers) anony-
mously, through anonymous questionnaires, unions, representatives, or third parties such
as external consultants so that the sender of a message may not be known to its receiver.
Are we more likely, or less likely to tell the truth when we are anonymous than otherwise?
Why is anonymous communication so widely used?
Firms or legislative bodies often hire consultants to obtain expert information, but
apart from the possibility that they may be biased depending on their personal preference
or political stance, psychological studies have found that experts tend to be "overcon-
dent" about the information they have (e.g. Kahneman et al.,1982; Gri¢ n and Tversky,
1992). How should a report from an overcondent expert be interpreted? Are bias and
overcondence qualitatively di¤erent? Is overcondence always bad?
Suppose that a decision maker chooses the quality or quantity of a good that is equally
consumed by all members of a group with di¤erent preferences. Before making her decision,
the decision maker may communicate with the members. For example, a teacher may
ask his students how fast or how di¢ cult they would like his lectures to be, or a local
authority may try to nd how much the people want it to spend on a public good. When
the decision maker must treat everybody equally, what happens to communication? Does
equal treatment encourage or discourage information revelation?
This paper extends the standard cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982, here-
after CS) where a single rational sender of a message communicates directly with the
receiver, and studies communication subject to various constraints such as anonymity,
overcondence, and equal treatment of multiple senders. We identify a remarkably simi-
lar strategic feature common to these settings and show that it can not only change the
structure of informative equilibria signicantly compared with that of CS (and many other
related models) but also improve information transmission when the level of conict be-
tween communicating parties is large. Moreover, we demonstrate that our framework can
be very closely linked to models in the literature on noisy communication, where a message
in one-to-one communication is assumed to be randomized according to a certain garbling
mechanism.
As a starting point of our analysis we show that, with the communication features
we have introduced, the action by the receiver (uninformed decision maker) becomes less
sensitive to the message form a sender (informed agent), compared with CS. In the case of
anonymous communication, since the receiver does not know who has sent which message,
it is not benecial for her to di¤erentiate between senders according to the messages. That
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is, the receiver takes the same action towards every sender. As a result, the receivers
action towards a particular senders message becomes less sensitive because the receiver
will take into account all messages when deciding on her action for a particular sender.
Clearly, if it is possible for the receiver to commit to treating every sender equally
in a multiple sender environment, it will have the same e¤ect on the receivers response
to messages as anonymity. Therefore, anonymity can be considered as one of possible
commitment devices for equal treatment.
Equal treatment may not be a constraint to be imposed but inherent in certain com-
munication environments, such as revelation of preferences for public goods. Suppose that
a decision maker asks the agents about the quality or quantity of a public good to be sup-
plied, while each agent has a di¤erent preference for the public good. Whether or not the
agents are anonymous, the decision maker is restricted to supply the same amount of the
public good consumed by all agents concerned. As a result, the sensitivity of the supply
of the public good to a particular message from an agent becomes weaker as the number
of the agents becomes larger. Therefore, the analysis of anonymous communication can be
directly applied to study information transmission in public good provision.
In single sender settings overcondence and garbling also make the receivers action
less sensitive to a message. If there is a possibility that the message does not convey any
information about the true state (sender type), the receiver will put less weight on the
message and her decision is based more on prior belief. This implies that, if modelled
appropriately, overcondence and garbling may be analyzed in the same framework as
communication under anonymity or communication in public good provision.
In CS, what makes a message less credible than truthful revelation is the presence of
the senders systematic bias that reects a conict of interest between the sender and the
receiver. That is, in any state the sender wishes to induce a higher (or lower) action than
the receiver and no types reveal truthfully because doing so always leads to a lower (or
higher) action than the sender wants. Consequently, the informative equilibria of CS are
characterized by a partition of the senders type space into a nite number of intervals,
where the types of sender in the same interval induces the same action.
In the informative equilibria of our model the type space is also partitioned into in-
tervals. However, in our model there is another source of information distortion: reduced
sensitivity to a message. This gives rise to some interesting characteristics in the senders
equilibrium strategies that are not found in CS.
First, while the bias in CS leads to either overstatement (in the case of upward bias)
or understatement (downward bias), the reduced sensitivity causes exaggeration, where
incentives to overstate and understate can coexist ex ante (before the sender observes
private information). When the receivers action is less sensitive to a message, the sender
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has incentives to report a message recommending an extremely low (high) action even if he
actually wishes to see only a moderately low (high) action. As a result, even if individual
conict is absent, the sender has incentives to exaggerate his type, in that he is tempted
to overstate the di¤erence between his type and the average type.
Second, when the receivers action is less sensitive, there may be a type of sender
who may reveal truthfully even in the presence of bias. A remarkable consequence of
the existence of the truth-telling type is that as the senders type becomes closer to the
truth-telling type, he is more willing to report accurate information. This also implies
that, unlike CS, there can be an innite number of intervals in the neighbourhood of the
truth-telling type.
Finally, the individual conict of interest (systematic bias) and incentives to exagger-
ate caused by weak response may partly o¤set each other, and when the level of conict
is large, the introduction of a constraint that leads to weak response may improve infor-
mation transmission and welfare. When the level of conict is high, revealing truthfully is
highly likely to induce an action unfavourable to the sender. When the receivers action is
less sensitive to a message, the inuence of a truthful message on the receivers action is
attenuated, which means that the costs of revealing information may be lower. We illus-
trate that the informational advantage of weak response is common to anonymity, equal
treatment, overcondence, and garbling.
1.1 Relation to the Literature
It is already known in the literature that the introduction of garbling or randomness in
messages may facilitate information transmission even in the presence of large conict of
interest between communicating parties. Myerson (1986) and Forges (1986) have shown
that multiple stage communication through a neutral third party may make information
transmission possible even when the level of conict is high, although their analyses ab-
stract from specic ways in which such a third party should be involved. Krishna and
Morgan (2004) and Mitusch and Strausz (2005) proposed particular garbling mechanisms
to improve information transmission, whereby a "mediator" randomizes the message from
the sender. In contrast Ganguly and Ray (2006) focus on situations where the introduction
of garbling cannot improve welfare. In this line of research a recent paper by Blume and
Board (2006) has obtained a strong welfare result: they have shown that in the uniform-
quadratic setting of CS if a certain garbling device is introduced it is possible to construct
an equilibrium that Pareto dominates any equilibrium in CS as long as the level of conict
is not too large.
One of our contributions here is to show that the framework for studying noisy commu-
nication extends much more widely than to garbling of messages which, though typically
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interpreted as what a "mediator" does, may not be easily introduced in practice. In par-
ticular, the same framework extends to other types of information transmission such as
communication with anonymity, overcondence, and in public good provision.
Another important contribution of this paper is to show that reduced sensitivity to a
message can change the structure of informative equilibria signicantly. We characterize
informative equilibria under a certain noise structure (for which garbling only one possible
interpretation) and examine important strategic features produced by the noise. In par-
ticular, we are able to demonstrate how the existence of the truth-telling type can a¤ect
the structure of informative equilibria, and how reduced response to a message gives rise
to incentives to exaggerate.
As anonymity and the concept of equal treatment necessarily involve multiple senders,
our model is also related to the literature on communication with multiple experts. Krishna
and Morgan (2001) study when senders should be consulted simultaneously or indepen-
dently and Battaglini (2002) shows that when there are multiple senders with di¤erent
biases and the state space is multidimensional, full revelation can be achieved for an ar-
bitrarily large conict of interest. A common feature of these papers is that the senders
observe the same or correlated states of nature while they have di¤erent biases. Our model
is closer to Austen-Smith (1993) and Wolinsky (2002) where senders observe independent
signals (types). However, while we assume that the sender types are distributed con-
tinuously, in their models the individual types and messages are assumed to be binary.
Because of the binary structure incentives to exaggerate cannot be fully incorporated into
their models. Austen-Smith (1993) focuses on the comparison between simultaneous and
sequential reporting, and Wolinsky (2002) considers information sharing between senders.
Thus the questions they address are also di¤erent from ours. As we will see later, in our
multiple sender setting the senders may be better thought of as agents in a social choice
problem rather than as experts, although in our single sender context the sender will be
interpreted as an expert.
Overcondence has been attracting much attention from physiologists and economists.
The literature on judgement under uncertainty has found that people tend to be over-
condent about their judgement, in that their subjective probability distributions are too
tight (Kahneman et al., 1982). Overcondence has been found in various professions such
as clinical phycologists (Oskamp, 1965), lawyers (Wagenaar and Karen, 1982), and policy
experts (Tetlock, 1999). The implications of overcondence for economic choices and espe-
cially for nancial markets have been studied recently by numerous researchers (e.g. Kyle
and Wang, 1997; Gervais and Odean 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998;
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). This paper examines the nature of communication with
an overcondent expert (whatever role the expert plays) rather than pricing or market
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returns.
The literature on public good provision has been studying mechanism design problems
where agents reveal their preferences (partially or fully) by contributing to or voting for
the provision of a public good (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984; Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989;
Ledyard, 1995). The decision maker is typically assumed to be a mechanism designer and
able to commit to a mechanism. This paper o¤ers an alternative approach to problems in
public good provision by assuming that the agents communicates with the decision maker
who cannot commit to a mechanism. In other words, the decision maker makes her decision
strategically after hearing or reading the messages, which seems to be the case in many
practical situations. Specically, our model can be interpreted as referring to situations
where the decision maker determines the quality/quantity of a public good without costs
or imposes the same cost/provision pair on all agents, each of whom has a di¤erent and
privately known preference.
The structure of informative equilibria we identify is also related to that of Melumad
and Shibano (1991) and Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2006), who, like us, study
cheap talk models with reduced response to the sender type (or a message), and nd an
equilibrium with the truth-telling type. Unlike our model, Melumad and Shibano (1991)
introduce reduced response directly into the receivers utility function, and they do not
derive the most informative equilibrium. Alonso, Dessein and Matouscheck (2006) nd
the equilibrium with an innite number of intervals in a two sender model where the
receiver coordinates her action for each sender. Since coordination requires taking into
account messages from both senders, the sensitivity of the receivers action to a message
is reduced as a result of her best response. Our model shares some characteristics in the
receivers action and the most informative equilibrium. However, since Alonso, Dessein
and Matouscheck (2006) focus on the issue of coordination and communication, they do
not consider systematic bias which has been the centre of attention in the cheap talk
literature since CS. Not only do we show that the interaction between the systematic bias
and exaggeration has important strategic and welfare implications, but we also show that
our simple yet general framework can be applied to many distinct situations, including
both single and multiple agent settings.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model where utility functions
are quadratic and a senders type is uniformly distributed. Section 3 characterizes the
equilibria of the model. Section 4 compares the playersexpected utilities in our constrained
communication settings and those in CS. Section 5 considers non-quadratic utilities and
shows that the introduction of the constraints extends the possibility of communication in
a more general setup. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Model
Consider rst the standard "uniform-quadratic" model of CS. A sender who has private
information about his type (or state of nature)  communicates with a receiver. The
senders utility function is US =  (y    b)2 and the receivers is UR =  (y  )2, where
y denotes the receivers action. The senders type  is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and
b  0 represents the senders bias or the level of conict. Before the receiver takes her
action, the sender can report a costless message m. The receiver updates her belief on 
according to the message. The rst order condition gives her best response conditional on
the message,
y = E [ j m] : (1)
CS have shown that, for b > 0, the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game are such that,
the type space is divided into a nite number of intervals and any types in a particular
interval induces the same action. There are multiple equilibria with any integer j such
that 1 < j < J where J is the largest number of intervals supported in equilibrium. CS
have also shown that in this setting J is non-increasing in b. If b = 0 both partiesinterest
coincide and truthful communication is possible, that is, y =  for all . The inuence
the senders message has on the receivers action is captured in (1). Hence, the senders
equilibrium strategy must be a best response to (1).
Let yS(m) denote the receivers (expected) action from the senders viewpoint, con-
ditional on the message he has reported. In CS, we have yS(m) = E [ j m]: the action
conditional on the message appears the same for both the sender and the receiver. In the
following we will extend the basic framework in some di¤erent ways, to study communi-
cation settings constrained by anonymity, equal treatment, overcondence and garbling.
Let us consider anonymous communication rst. As we have suggested earlier, when the
receiver chooses an action based on messages from many senders, from a senders view-
point his message has less inuence on the receivers action compared with the standard
one-to-one communication. As we will demonstrate shortly, the receivers expected action
from a senders viewpoint is given by the following form:
yS(m)  E [ j m] + 1
2
(1  ); (2)
where 0 <  < 1. It is easy to see that, compared with (1), the receiver puts less weight
on the senders message because it is weighted at  < 1. Moreover, in expected terms, the
action is biased towards the unconditional expectation of the senders type 1=2. Later we
will derive (2) as the receivers best response to the senders message in several di¤erent
settings.
Before deriving (2) formally, let us briey comment on the implications of the reduced
response to the senders message. Although the change in the best response from (1) to
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Figure 1: Senders desired action and receivers best response
(2) may look innocuous, it may have a great impact on a senders strategy. First, when
the receivers best response is given by (2), there may be a "truth-telling type", the type
of sender who may report his true type in equilibrium even for b > 0. Suppose that the
senders type is . The senders desired action is  + b  yS(), while the receivers best
response with  is, according to (2),  + 1
2
(1  )  yR(): Hence, If the senders type is
such that
yS() = yR() or
 =
1
2
  b
1    ^; (3)
the sender may induce his (expected) desired action  + b by reporting truthfully. Hence,
if  < 1 and b is not too large, there may exist ^ 2 [0; 1] that satises (3). The senders
desired action and the receivers best response for given  are illustrated in Figure 1 where
the horizontal axis denotes the senders type  and the vertical axis denotes the receivers
action y. In CS the receivers best response (1) is given by the 45 degree line, which never
coincides with the senders desired action yS(). This implies that no type has incentives
to tell the truth in CS. In contrast, when the receivers best response is yR(), it crosses
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yS() at ^, which implies that the senders desired action and the receivers best response
coincide at ^.
Second, when the receivers best response is given by (2) the sender may have incentives
to exaggerate his type. In CS, yS() is always above the 45 degree line for b > 0, so that the
sender has incentives to overstate his type only. However we have yS() < yR() (yS() >
yR()) if  < ^ ( > ^), in which case the sender has incentives to understate (overstate)
his type. Hence, unlike CS, the sender can be biased in both directions, depending on his
type.
As we will see later, these two features change the structure of informative equilibria
signicantly. Before characterizing equilibria, however, let us motivate (2) through several
di¤erent examples of constrained communication.
2.1 Anonymous Communication
Suppose that there is a single receiver who communicates with n senders. The payo¤ of
the receiver is given by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility  
nX
i=1
(yi   i)2, where yi is the
receivers action towards sender i and i is his type. In other words, the receiver determines
n-dimensional action y = [y1; y2; :::; yi; :::; yn]. Sender is von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
is given by  (yi   i   b)2, where b represents the ex-ante individual bias that is assumed
to be symmetric across all senders. We also assume b  0 without loss of generality. i
is private information to sender i, and independently and uniformly distributed on [0; 1].
Before the receiver chooses her action, each sender reports a message mi on his type,
independently and simultaneously. We focus on symmetric sender strategies, that is, any
senders with the same type follow the same strategy.
Under anonymity, the receiver gets nmessages before she chooses y1; y2; :::; yi; :::; yn, but
she cannot tell which sender has sent a particular message. In other words, every message
corresponds to a particular sender with probability 1=n. Therefore, although the receiver
can in principle take a di¤erent action towards each sender, the receivers best response
conditional on the messages is to treat every sender equally, or y1 = y2 = ::: = yi = ::: = yn.
To motivate this setup, consider a situation where a manager in a rm must allocate
tasks to his workers. Each worker has a privately known ability or idea about what he
wants to do, but they all would like to have an easier task than the receiver would want
them to do. If each worker communicates with the manager directly, the workers may not
reveal their information truthfully because they may fear that they might be assigned too
hard a task. In this situation, the manager may choose to communicate with the workers
anonymously, through anonymous report forms or a worker representative. In fact, as
we will show later, when the level of individual conict is large, it may be the case that
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messages are completely uninformative in one-to-one communication but some information
may still be transmitted in anonymous communication.
Let us consider the receivers action from a senders perspective. The receivers best
response to the n messages she receives is given by
yi = E[i] =
1
n
nX
i=1
E[i j mi]: (4)
From sender is viewpoint, therefore, the expected action by the receiver conditional on
the senders own message is
ySi(mi) =
1
n
E[i j mi] + n  1
n
E [E[i j mi]] ;
since sender i does not observe other senderstypes or messages. Using the fact that the
expected value of a conditional expectation is the prior expectation, we have
ySi(mi) =
1
n
E[i j mi] + n  1
n
 1
2
: (5)
Note that (5) is a special case of (2) where  = 1=n. Hence, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of this game can be characterized by deriving each senders best response to (2).
2.2 Equal Treatment/Public Good Provision
The above discussion on anonymous communication implies that the essential feature that
leads to (5) is equal treatment of senders. That is, to the extent that the receiver can com-
mit to equal treatment, it will have the same e¤ect on the senders strategy as anonymity.
In certain environments equal treatment is implied in the receivers action. Consider
non-anonymous communication with n agents (senders) where the decision maker (receiver)
determines the provision of a public good y. For instance, a high y may be a large amount of
the public good with heavy tax burden. Alternatively, y can be thought of as the pace of a
lecture in a classroom of n students with di¤erent abilities. The di¤erence from anonymous
communication is that equal treatment is inherent in the receivers action because of the
nature of the public good to be supplied. In other words, the receiver chooses a scalar y
that determines the utilities of all agents.
Each of the agents has a di¤erent preference for y and the utility of an agent is given
by  (y   i)2. Unlike the case of anonymous communication, in this context it would be
appropriate to assume b = 0, so that there is no individual conict between the decision
maker and each agent. The decision maker maximizes the sum of the agents utilities
 
nX
n=1
(y   i)2, but she cannot commit to a mechanism. The agents send messages to the
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decision maker before she chooses y. Under these assumptions, since the receivers maxi-
mization problem is identical to that of the anonymous communication case, the receivers
best response is given by (4). Thus the expected action from a senders viewpoint the
receivers action from sender is perspective is (2). Therefore, we can examine communica-
tion regarding the provision of a public good by a benevolent decision maker in the same
way as anonymous communication.
2.3 Overcondent Expert
So far we have assumed that there are multiple senders, but for this and the next application
we show that (2) can be motivated even in settings with a single sender. In the previous
applications we have maintained the assumption that the sender observes his type correctly.
What if the sender is overcondent about what he has observed, when the type the sender
observes may be wrong? This situation corresponds to a class of behavioural attributes
called overcondence in the precision of ones information. Specically, we assume that
the sender observes pure noise with a certain probability, but he always believes that his
observation is correct.
Let p be the probability that the sender observes the true type, and 1   p be the
probability that the type the sender observes is pure noise, which is uniformly distributed on
[0; 1] independently of the true type. We assume that p is common knowledge. Clearly, p =
1 in CS. The notion of overcondence is captured by the assumption that the sender believes
that the type he observes is always correct.1 From the receivers viewpoint the message
reects the true type only with probability p, and otherwise the message is completely
uninformative about the true type. Hence, we have the receivers best response given the
message
yR(m) = pEs[ j m] + (1  p)1
2
; (6)
where Es[ j m] is the expected value of  conditional on the message, provided that the
senders observation is correct. Note that from the overcondent senders viewpoint the
receivers action is also given by (6). Since the sender believes that his observation is
always correct, the receivers action in communication with the overcondent sender takes
the same form as (2), where  = p.
1It is possible to interpret this set-up in terms of the receivers undercondence in the senders observa-
tion. Suppose that the sender always observes a correct type but the receiver (due to some irrationality)
believes that the sender observes the true state only with probability q and otherwise observes a noise. It
is easy to check that the equilibrium strategies are equivalent to the case of an overcondent sender. The
only di¤erence lies in interpretation of welfare.
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2.4 Garbling
As we have seen earlier, it is known in the literature that the introduction of randomization
in messages may facilitate information transmission particularly when the level of conict
is large. We show that (2) can be derived through a garbling device too. Suppose that with
probability q < 1 the message from the sender is delivered to the receiver as it has originally
been reported. However, with probability 1   q the message is randomized according to
the ex ante distribution of messages induced in equilibrium. We assume that q is common
knowledge. Naturally q = 1 in CS. This garbling device has the analytically convenient
feature that upon receiving a message the receiver cannot update her belief on whether
the message is from the sender himself or generated by randomization. In other words,
whatever the message is, the posterior probability that it is "genuine" is also q.
To see how this randomization device works, consider an informative equilibrium with
two intervals where the message induces either "low" or "high" action. Suppose that
ex ante (before the sender learns his type) a message recommending "low" is sent with
probability a and a message recommending "high" is sent with probability 1  a (in other
words, with probability a the senders type is such that he recommends "low"). Suppose
further that the sender type is such that he recommends "low". He reports a message that
recommends "low", but with the garbling device the message is delivered to the receiver
without randomization only with probability q. With probability 1   q the message is
randomized, so "low" and "high" are recommended with probability a and 1 a respectively.
Overall, given that the sender recommends "low" action, the probability that this action
is actually induced is q + (1  q)a.
From the receivers perspective, the message she receives is "genuine" only with prob-
ability q. Otherwise the message is the one that was generated by the randomization
device. In addition, since the distribution of messages with randomization is identical to
the equilibrium distribution of messages the sender reports conditional on the delivered
message, the receiver cannot update the belief on whether the message has been generated
by randomization. LetmS andmR be the message the sender has actually reported and the
message delivered to the receiver, respectively. The receivers best response to a message
is given by
yR(mR) = qE[ j mS = mR] + (1  q)1
2
: (7)
E[ j mS = mR] is the expected  given that the message is the one originally reported by
the sender, which is the case with probability q. From the senders viewpoint, this implies
that if the original message is delivered to the receiver
yS(mS) = qE[ j mS] + (1  q)1
2
: (8)
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Note that if the message is garbled the senders report has no inuence on y. Therefore, as
in the previous applications introduced above, the senders equilibrium strategy with the
garbling mechanism can be derived by considering a best response to (2), where  = q.
The garbling device we study here is closely related to one studied by Blume and Board
(2006), which also leads to (8) in the uniform-quadratic setting if the senders strategy is
specied appropriately. In their model when garbling occurs the message delivered to the
receiver is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. Blume and Board (2006) also consider sender
strategies that allow the receiver to update her belief on whether the message is from the
sender or from the uniform distribution, in which case (8) does not hold.
3 Equilibrium
In the following we study the senders strategy with respect to (2), the receivers best
response to the message. In the standard setting, CS have shown that, if the receivers
ideal action and that of the sender never coincide, any perfect Bayesian equilibrium takes
a partitional form, where the type space is divided into a nite number of intervals. If the
receivers best response is given by (1) as in CS, both partiesdesired actions di¤er for any
sender types: while the receivers optimal action is , the senders is  + b.
Although we will basically follow the equilibrium characterization due to CS, we require
one important modication to characterize equilibria when the receivers best response is
(2). The modication concerns the di¤erence between a senders desired action and that
of the receiver for a given sender type. As we have already seen in (3), if the receivers
best response is given by (2), as long as b is not too large there exists a truth-telling type
^, whose desired action (in expected terms) coincides with that of the receiver from the
senders viewpoint.
Thus we will identify two classes of equilibria in this game; namely T-equilibria where
the truth-telling type exists and induces the unique action for this type, and N-equilibria
where there is no truth-telling type or the truth-telling type exists but the truth-telling
type induces the same as his neighbouring types (i.e. he sticks to a partitional strategy). As
we will see below, N-equilibria are characterized exactly in the same way as CS. However,
for T-equilibria an additional condition is required to satisfy incentive compatibility.
Let us rst consider N-equilibria. Let a and a be two points in [0; 1] such that a < a.
Suppose that the sender observes  2 [a; a). From the assumption that  is uniformly
distributed, we have the conditional expectation of 
E [ j  2 [a; a)] = a+ a
2
:
Hence, according to (2), we have the receivers action from the senders viewpoint given
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this belief
yS(a; a)
= E[ j  2 [a; a)] + (1  )1
2
= 
a+ a
2
+ (1  )1
2
: (9)
Note that except in the case of an overcondent sender, the receivers action is a random
variable from the senders viewpoint. However, the randomness is caused only by the other
senders in anonymous communication and public good provision, and by the randomization
device in communication with garbling. Hence, the variance of the receivers action is
independent from the senders strategy (message). Since the utility functions are quadratic,
we can focus our attention on the expected value of the receivers action from the senders
viewpoint, yS, in order to characterize equilibrium sender strategies.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the receivers best response is given by (2). Then there
exists a positive integer J(b) such that, for every J with 1  J  J(b), the following sender
strategy q(m j ) supports at least one N-equilibrium:
q (m j ) is uniform on m 2 [aj; aj+1] if  2 (aj; aj+1): (10)
 (yS(aj 1; aj)     b)2 =  (yS(aj; aj+1)     b)2
if  = aj; for j = 1; :::; J   1: (A)
a0 = 0; aJ = 1: (11)
Further, all other equilibria have relationships between  and the receivers induced choice
of yS that are the same as those in this class for some value of J with 1  J  J(b).
Proof. See Theorem 1 in CS. In CS  = 1 but the same method of proof applies for
N-equilibria as long as 0 <   1.
With the uniform-quadratic setup, the characterization of N-equilibria given (2) is
essentially the same as that of informative equilibria in CS. The intervals are determined
by the "no arbitrage" condition (A), which says that in equilibrium when sender is type
falls on the boundaries of intervals aj, he must be indi¤erent between two associated actions
(from the senders viewpoint) yS(aj 1; aj) and yS(aj; aj+1).
Since the utility function is symmetric with respect to yS and the sender cannot inuence
var(y), for (A) to be true, it must be that the expected value of the receivers action that
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the sender with type aj wishes to induce, aj + b; lies exactly halfway in between these two
expected actions induced by two di¤erent messages
aj + b =
y(aj 1; aj) + y(aj; aj+1)
2
:
Hence from (9) we have
aj + b = 

aj 1 + aj
4
+
aj + aj+1
4

+ (1  )1
2
;
which gives a second-order di¤erence equation
aj+1   (4  2)aj + aj 1 = 4b+ 2   2: (12)
Substituting a0 = 0 and aJ = 1, we can solve the J simultaneous equations with J
unknown variables in (12) to obtain the exact N-equilibrium partition that corresponds
to the particular , b and J . In other words, any equilibrium partition must satisfy (12).
From (12) we obtain the following example.
Example 1 Suppose that  = 1
2
and b = 0. Then the partition a0 = 0, a1 = 512 , a2 =
1
2
,
a3 =
7
12
, a4 = 1 constitutes an N-equilibrium.
Notice that the length of an interval is narrower as it becomes closer to 1
2
. This means
that a message is more credible when it is moderate (closer to 1
2
), and less credible when
it is extreme. Intuitively, since the receiver puts less weight on the message, even with
b = 0 the sender has incentives to exaggerate his type, in that he overstates the di¤erence
between his type and the average type 1
2
. If a senders type is below (above) the average,
he reports an even lower (higher) type than he actually is. Therefore, the equilibrium
partition above takes into account the tendency to exaggerate.
Interestingly, the above partition does not support a T-equilibrium, where the truth-
telling type induces the unique action for him only. To see this, note that since b = 0 we
have the truth-telling type ^ = 1
2
(= a2). Suppose that the receivers belief is such that the
truth-telling type reveals truthfully. If  = 1
2
we have the corresponding action yS(12) =
1
2
.
Let us consider a sender with i = 12 +  for some small  > 0. If he sends a message
according to the proposed partition, he induces yS(12 ;
7
12
) = 13
24
 0:542. On the other hand
if he mimics the truth-telling type, yS = 12 . Since the senders ideal action is
1
2
+, for small
enough  he prefers mimicking the truth-telling type. Hence, the partition in the Example
does not support a T-equilibrium.
This implies that T-equilibria cannot simply be characterized by the "no arbitrage"
condition (A). What condition must be satised for a partition given by (A) to support
a T-equilibrium? The problem with supporting T-equilibria is that no other types than ^
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should benet from inducing yS(^). In other words, the sender with type  = ^+ must not
induce yS(^), but rather his message must induce yS(aj; aj+1) such that ^ +  2 [aj; aj+1).
For this to be the case, it must be that the di¤erence between the senders ideal action
yS(^+ ) and the action induced by his message is smaller when he follows the partitional
strategy:
yS(^ + )  yS(^) 
yS(^ + )  yS(aj; aj+1)
) ^ + + b  (^ + b) 
^ + + b  yS(aj; aj+1)
) 2  yS(aj; aj+1)  (^ + b)  0: (13)
This implies that as long as a partition determined by (A) also satises (13), the partition
for [0; 1] n f^g with ^ telling the truth supports a T-equilibrium. Note that any type such
that i > ^ +  does not mimic ^ if i = ^ +  does not, because @
2US
@y@
> 0 implies that the
utility of i > ^+  when inducing yS(^) (by mimicking ^) is lower than that of i = ^+ .
Therefore to see whether (13) is satised in a partition given by (A), it su¢ ces to consider
an innitesimally small .
Clearly there are only two cases where (13) is satised. One is the case in which
^ +  2 [aj; aj+1), aj < ^ < aj+1 for some j and
aj + aj+1
2
= ^.
If this is the case, [aj; aj+1) is an interval with some positive length that has ^ exactly in
the middle. The other is the case where ^ +  2 [aj; aj+1) and aj; aj+1 > ^ such that the
distance between aj and aj+1 is innitesimally small and the interval is arbitrarily close
to ^. This second case implies that in a T-equilibrium there can be an innite number
of intervals in the neighbourhood of ^. Before we derive the equilibrium with an innite
number of intervals, let us consider the following example of a T-equilibrium with a nite
number of intervals.
Example 2 Suppose that  = 1
2
and b = 0. Then the partition a0 = 0, a1 = 37 , a2 =
4
7
,
a3 = 1 supports both T-equilibrium and N-equilibrium.
Since the partition in this Example is derived from (12), clearly it supports an N-
equilibrium. In addition, introducing truth-telling for ^ = 1
2
to this partition does not
change the structure of the N-equilibrium because both the truth-telling type and any
other types such that i 2 [37 ; 47) induce the same action yS = 12 .
Is full revelation possible in this above example where b = 0? In CS, full revelation
can be supported in equilibrium when b = 0. However, in communication subject to the
constraints we consider, this is not the case. In fact, full revelation is not an equilibrium
for any b.
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Figure 2: Most informative equilibrium
Proposition 2 If  < 1, full revelation is not a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in anonymous
communication for any b.
Proof. Suppose that the receivers belief is such that the sender reveals truthfully (m = 
for all ). From the receivers strategy (2), sender is best response m is to induce the
desired expected action
 + b = m +
1
2
(1  ) or
m =
 + b  1=2

+
1
2
:
Hence, m =  only if  = 1
2
  b
1   ^ 2 [0; 1],  = 0, or  = 1. Otherwise, m <  if
 < ^, and m >  if  > ^:
When the receivers best response is given by (2), even if b = 0 the sender has incentives
to exaggerate the di¤erence between the average 1
2
and his type. In other words, when his
type  is low, revealing truthfully leads to the receivers (expected) action that is not low
enough for the sender. However, if  = 1
2
the sender reveals truthfully because there is no
need of exaggeration.
Now let us characterize the most informative equilibrium in which there are as many
intervals as possible in the type space. Solving (12) with respect to aj, we obtain
aj = ^ +
a1 + 2^(1    
p
1  )
4
p
1  

2   + 2p1  

j
 a1 + 2^(1   +
p
1  )
4
p
1  

2     2p1  

j
; (14)
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where ^ = 1
2
  b
1  is the truth-telling type. Let aJ be the terminal point of the partition
and aJ = 1. Rearranging (14) and letting J !1, we have
a1 ! 2^

1  1 
p
1  


 a1:
This implies that as long as a1 > 0, (14) can generate an innite number of intervals in
equilibrium. Indeed, substituting a1 into (14), we obtain
aj = ^   ^

2     2p1  

j
: (15)
Note that since
0 <
2     2p1  

< 1 for 0 <  < 1;
(15) gives a strictly increasing sequence that converges to the truth-telling type ^. This
converging sequence constitutes a partition in [0; ^). Let the sequence of ajs obtained by
(15) be P0.
It remains to obtain the partition in (^; 1]. Let a0j be a decreasing sequence such that
a00 = 1. Solving (12) with a
0
0 = 1 and J !1, we have a strictly decreasing sequence that
converges to ^
a0j = ^ + (1  ^)

2     2p1  

j
. (16)
This sequence constitutes a partition of (^; 1] with an innite number of intervals. Let the
sequence obtained by (2) be P1. Dene P  P0 [ P1 [ ^. Clearly P satises (12) and
(13), and therefore supports the most informative equilibrium for ^  0 or equivalently
b  1
2(1 ) .
From Figure 2 we can see that in the most informative equilibrium there are an innite
number of intervals in the neighbourhood of the truth-telling type ^, who induces the unique
action for him. The equilibrium partition also takes into account the senders incentives to
exaggerate his type. The length of intervals is narrower as they become closer to ^, which
implies that a message is more credible when it is closer to the truth-telling type.
Figure 2 suggests that under many circumstances (anonymity, equal treatment, public
good provision, overcondence, and garbling) considered so far, weak sensitivity to a mes-
sage has just as important implications for the nature of information transmission as the
systematic bias b, which has been the centre of attention in the cheap talk literature. In
particular, as long as b is not too large the truth-telling type exists under a wider range
of parameters, and this can change the structure of informative equilibria dramatically,
compared with CS and many models of information transmission where the sole source of
informational distortion is b and the sender has incentives to overstate  (for b > 0) only.
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In the rest of this section we consider for what value of b informative communication is
possible. Let b denote the largest bias that can support an informative equilibrium. Since
J is non-decreasing in b, in order to nd b it su¢ ces to consider the condition under which
the equilibrium with two intervals can be supported. By solving (12) for a0 = 0, a2 = 1,
we obtain a1 = 12   2b2  . In order for this equilibrium to be supported it must be that
a1  0, which implies
b  b = 2  
4
. (17)
In the uniform-quadratic case of CS it has been shown that an informative equilibrium
exists for b  1=4, which can be conrmed in our model, by letting  = 1. The above
condition implies that by introducing  < 1 the possibility of informative communication
can be extended beyond b = 1=4. We have that b! 1=2 as  ! 0. As we will see later in
our welfare analysis, this property leads to another important result of this paper: not only
may  change the structure of informative equilibria, but it may also enhance information
transmission when b is large.
If the level of conict b exceeds 1=4, communication is completely uninformative without
anonymity, equal treatment, overcondence, or garbling. However, when communication
is subject to these constraints we may potentially have an informative equilibrium up to
b < 1=2 and this will prove welfare improving.
A wider possibility of information transmission when b is large comes from the fact that
the receivers response to a message is weaker, as we have seen in (2). The key parameter
is , the sensitivity of the receivers action to a message. For example, suppose that  is
very low and that the receiver believes that the sender reveals truthfully. When  = 1 the
receivers best response is (1), so by revealing truthfully the sender induces the action y = 
which is lower than the senders ideal action  + b. On the other hand, when  < 1 even
if the sender reveals  truthfully, the corresponding action by the receiver may be higher
than  (and closer to  + b). Hence, for a relatively large value of b, reduced response to
the message works as if it reduces the level of conict.
4 Comparison
Although the constraints on communication considered above share the strikingly similar
strategic feature represented by (2), the playersexpected utilities in an informative equi-
librium di¤er signicantly depending on the particular setting in question. Therefore in
this section we consider the multiple sender setting (anonymity/equal treatment) and the
single sender setting (overcondence/garbling) separately.
Before examining when introducing a particular constraint is benecial, let us briey
consider the issue of multiple equilibria. As in most cheap talk models, there are multiple
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equilibria in our model. In particular, there always exists a "babbling" equilibrium where
the senders message is completely uninformative. CS have shown that in the single sender
game for given b both the sender and the receiver prefer an equilibrium with more intervals
as long as the game satises their monotonicity assumption (M).2 The equilibrium partition
in our model satises (M), and some of their results extend to our model.
Proposition 3 In communication subject to any constraint introduced above, namely
anonymity, equal treatment, overcondence and garbling, if we x  (i.e. n, p, or q) both
the receiver and the sender(s) are better o¤ in an equilibrium with more intervals.
Proof. See Appendix.
For the overcondent expert scenario, we can calculate the senders expected utility
based on his ex ante belief that his observation is always correct, or on the ex post real-
ization of his payo¤. Proposition 3 applies in both cases.
4.1 Anonymous Communication/Equal Treatment
Let us focus on the most informative equilibria for given b and consider when anonymous
communication (and hence imposing equal treatment) is more desirable than CS. Note
that without anonymity or commitment to equal treatment the information transmission
between the receiver and sender i in our model is equivalent to the single sender game in
CS. Therefore we can directly compare the equilibrium outcome of our model and that of
CS. Since  = 1=n, in the this setting (17) implies that information transmission can occur
up to b = 1=2 as the number of anonymous senders becomes su¢ ciently large (n ! 1).
In the previous section we have shown that the most informative equilibrium involves an
innite number of intervals for b  1
4
and communication under anonymity is informative
if b  2 
4
= 1
2
  1
4n
. Hence, if b 2 [1
4
; 1
2
  1
4n
); information transmission can occur even if
messages are completely uninformative in CS. The more senders there are, the larger the
bias can be for information transmission (and welfare improvement) to occur in equilibrium.
The comparison between the most informative equilibria when n = 2 is shown in Figure
3. The horizontal axis represents the bias b and the vertical axis represents the expected
utility of the receiver. Since n = 2, UR =  (y1 1)2 (y2 2)2. Note that the curve for CS
becomes at for b  1=4, indicating that communication is completely uninformative. Both
curves are the same for b  3=8, where communication is uninformative also in anonymous
communication. We can see that the receiver prefers anonymous communication if b &
0:194. A similar graph can be drawn for the senders, and they also prefer anonymous
2See p.1444 in CS and Appendix of the present paper.
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Figure 3: Receivers expected utility in the most informative equilibrium when n = 2
communication when b & 0:194. When the level of conict is large, both parties can
benet from anonymous communication.
This result is driven by the trade-o¤ between inexibility in the receivers action and
information revelation. Imposing equal treatment itself is costly because it prevents the
receiver from choosing her action optimally for each sender. However, when b is high re-
duced sensitivity as a result of equal treatment induces more information revelation. When
the level of individual conict is high, the benet of information transmission becomes so
large relative to CS that it outweighs the cost of inexibility. Naturally, anonymity can
be considered as a commitment device for the receiver to treat every sender equally. If
she can commit to equal treatment in some other way, it will also have the same e¤ect on
communication as anonymity.
4.2 Garbling
In our model, from the receivers viewpoint overcondence and garbling have exactly the
same e¤ect on the characteristics of the message she receives: with probability p (overcon-
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dence) or q (garbling) the message is indeed indicative of , and otherwise it does not
convey any information. By assumption, of course, the receiver does not know whether the
message is informative at all.
Let us rst look at the model in terms of the garbling scenario and focus on the equilib-
rium with two intervals, which is analytically convenient and has an especially straightfor-
ward interpretation: there are two possible recommended actions, and each recommenda-
tion the sender has reported is replaced by the other with certain respective probabilities.
Krishna andMorgan (2004) andMitusch and Strausz (2005) interpret such a randomization
mechanism as the role a mediator plays between communicating parties.
In order to see the direct relationship between the level of conict and the degree of
randomization, the receivers expected utility for given q and b under a large conict is given
in Figure 4, where UR =  (y )2. This gure shows that the introduction of garbling can
increase the receivers expected utility, and a similar graph can be drawn for the senders
expected utility too. In CS it is implied that q = 1, and there is no informative equilibrium
when b is larger than 1=4. However, when q < 1 is introduced there may be an informative
equilibrium up to b < 1=2 and it Pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium. If q can
be chosen so as to maximize both partiesexpected utilities, it will take into account the
trade-o¤between information loss due to garbling and information revelation by the agent.
When q is lower the message from the sender is more likely to be garbled and this makes the
receivers action even less sensitive to the received message. While the possibility that the
message is garbled is costly, reduced sensitivity encourages information revelation which is
benecial in itself. The inverted U-shaped curves in Figure 4 capture this intuition.
With a related but more strategically exible garbling device than ours, Blume and
Board (2006) have shown that it is possible to construct an equilibrium that Pareto dom-
inates all CS equilibria for almost any 0 < b < 1=2, although a simple interpretation as
above is not available because the way Blume and Board (2006) specify the sender strategy
is more complex.3
4.3 Overcondence
Given the strategic similarities, overcondence can also be regarded as a way to overcome
an experts intrinsic bias. As we have discussed earlier, apart from being overcondent
an expert may well be biased towards a particular direction. For example, when asked to
3Blume and Board (2006) assume that when randomized the message delivered to the receiver is distrib-
uted uniformly on [0; 1]. Depending on sender strategy (i.e. how he randomize his message given his type),
this garbling device allows for a far wider range of equilibrium strategies than the ones we consider in this
paper. In particular, an equilibrium strategy can be such that, upon receiving a message, the receiver can
update his belief on whether the message is from the sender himself or from the uniform distribution.
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Figure 4: Receivers expected utility in equilibrium with two intervals
assess the protability of a potential project an expert may be tempted to overstate the
protability, especially when he has been involved in planning and already invested sub-
stantially in the project. A policy consultant may also be biased depending on his political
stance. When the bias is large, communication with such experts becomes less informative
or possibly uninformative at all. However, our analysis suggests that overcondence in
their expertise, which is generally thought of as a negative factor, may actually help to
encourage information revelation.
If a sender observes the true state only with probability p but he correctly recognizes
p (i.e. he is not overcondent), the analysis is analogous to CS. In particular, there will
never be incentives to exaggerate or a truth-telling type (See Appendix). However, the
senders ideal action given that he has observed  is now
yS() = p + (1  p)1
2
+ b.
In Appendix, we show that if the sender recognizes p correctly
b =
p
4
:
Therefore, the largest bias that allows communication to occur is lower than 1=4. The
lack of expertise (low p) makes the problem caused by the senders bias even worse, but
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overcondence may extend the possibility of communication and improve welfare.
5 General Setting
So far we have focused on quadratic utility functions with uniformly distributed sender
types, in order to illustrate the characteristics of various communication settings such as
anonymity, public good provision, overcondence and garbling. In particular, we have
shown that introducing these features in communication may improve information trans-
mission, especially when the level of conict is large. In this section, we show that this
property holds more generally than the uniform-quadratic setting we have considered so
far.
Let a sender is von Neumann-Morgenstern utility be USi = U(y; i; b) and that of
the receiver be UR =
Pn
i=1 U(y; i; 0), where U1 = 0 for some y (so there is a unique
maximum with respect to y), and U11 < 0, U12 > 0, and U13 > 0. We assume that i has
a continuous density function on [0; 1], but the distribution does not have to be uniform.
However, we also assume that the utility functions and the type distribution are such
that, if a rational sender and the receiver communicate directly as in CS, any equilibrium
partition satises their monotonicity condition (M). If there are multiple senders, types are
independently and identically distributed. Let b be the highest level of bias for which an
informative equilibrium exists in unconstrained communication (i.e. CS). The condition
(M) guarantees that b is well-dened. In what follows, we will establish the existence of
an equilibrium with two non-degenerate intervals at some b  b.
Before we discuss the existence of an informative equilibrium when b is high, let us
look at the issue of the truth-telling type. In communication with a single sender without
overcondence or garbling, CS have shown that the receivers ideal action and that of
the sender never coincide for b > 0 due to U13 > 0. This implies that no type reveals
truthfully in equilibrium. However, as we will see shortly, if there are multiple senders to
be treated equally, or if we introduce garbling or overcondence, U13 > 0 no longer implies
that a particular type of senders ideal action (or distribution of the action) and that of
the receiver never coincide. If they do coincide at some  there may exist a T-equilibrium,
where the truth-telling type reveals truthfully. In a T-equilibrium, as we have seen in
the uniform-quadratic setting, we require an additional condition to the "no arbitrage"
condition: any other types than the truth-telling type must not induce the action (or
distribution) for the truth-telling type. This implies that there are an innite number of
intervals in the neighbourhood of the truth-telling type, or that the truth-telling type is
internal to an interval and his desired distribution/action coincides with the one induced
by his neighbouring types in the interval.
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5.1 Anonymous Communication/Equal Treatment
Let us rst consider direct communication with a single rational sender i, which is essen-
tially equivalent to the general version of CS. Let y(a; a) be the receivers best response to
the sender when his belief is such that  2 [a; a). CS have shown that communication an
informative equilibrium cannot exist for b > b, where the critical value b is dened by
U(y(0; 1); 0; b) = U(y(0; 0); 0; b): (18)
This condition implies that the sender with type  = 0 is indi¤erent between revealing
truthfully and being completely disguised. From the assumptions on the utility functions
it is easy to see that y(0; 1) > y(0; 0) and thus U(y(0; 1); 0; b) > U(y(0; 0); 0; b) for all b > b.
In the following we will focus on the anonymous communication where n = 2, and show
that when b = b there exists an informative equilibrium where the type space is partitioned
by at least two non-degenerate intervals, and that by continuity there exists an informative
equilibrium with b 2 [b;b+] at least for some small . This result extends to the case where
n  3 but the exposition becomes much more complicated. As in the uniform-quadratic
setting anything that enables the receiver to commit to equal treatment of all senders will
have the same e¤ect on communication as anonymity.
Let us denote the sender we focus on by i and the other sender by  i. The receivers
action conditional on two anonymous messages about sender types is given by
y (aj; aj+1 j ak; ak+1)
= argmax
y
R aj+1
aj
U(y; i; 0)f(i)diR aj+1
aj
f(i)di
+
R ak+1
ak
U(y;  i; 0)f( i)d iR ak+1
ak
f( i)d i
: (19)
That is, y (aj; aj+1 j ak; ak+1) is the receivers best response when i 2 [aj; aj+1) and  i 2
[ak; ak+1). Let ySi(a; a) be the receivers action from sender is viewpoint, conditional on the
receivers belief that i 2 [a; a). Clearly ySi(a; a) is a random variable in any informative
equilibrium. In the uniform-quadratic setting, in order to derive the senders equilibrium
strategy, it su¢ ces to consider the expected value of the action, since sender is utility
is a¤ected only by the expected value and the variance of the receivers action, and the
variance is independent from sender is strategy. However, in the current setting we need
to consider the entire distribution of the receivers action because the utility is now a¤ected
by higher moments. In other words, we must fully take into account the fact that, from a
senders viewpoint, a message induces a particular distribution of the receivers action.
The following lemma says that under anonymity, if b = b a sender with i = 0 strictly
prefers revealing truthfully than being completely disguised.
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Lemma 1 Suppose that the senderspartitional strategy is such that the type space is
divided into [0]; (0; 1]. In anonymous communication, if b = b, sender i with i = 0 is
strictly better o¤ by inducing ySi(0; 0) than ySi(0; 1).
Proof. Suppose that sender is type is i = 0. If he follows this partitional strategy, he
reveals truthfully, and symmetric strategies imply that if the other senders type is  i = 0
he also reveals truthfully. However, the probability that  i = 0 is 0 since the senders type
is drawn from a continuous density function. Hence, almost surely, the receivers action
yC is given by
yC = argmax
y
U(y; 0; 0) +
Z 1
0
U(y;  i; 0)f( i)d i:
On the other hand, if the message of the sender i induces the belief i 2 (0; 1] the
receivers action is given by, almost surely,
yN = y (0; 1 j 0; 1) = y(0; 1);
where yi(0; 1) denotes the action in the uninformative equilibrium in CS. We have y(0; 1) 
yN > yC > y(0; 0) since the receivers utility function is supermodular in y and i. Recall
that by denition, at b = b the sender is indi¤erent between y(0; 1) and y(0; 0). By
concavity of the utility function, the sender is strictly better o¤ with yC than yN . Hence,
the sender with i = 0 strictly prefers to reveal truthfully under the partitional strategy.
Lemma 1 says that the partitional strategy [0]; (0; 1] is (strictly) incentive compatible for
i = 0. However, the above construction does not support a perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
because a sender with i = 0 +  for small  will also prefer to induce ySi(0; 0) rather
than ySi(0; 1). We use Lemma 1 in the following Proposition to show that there exists an
equilibrium with two non-degenerate intervals [0; a), [a; 1].
Proposition 4 Suppose that b = b. In anonymous communication, there exists a par-
tially informative equilibrium where the type space is partitioned into two non-degenerate
intervals.
Proof. In the following we will show that a symmetric sender strategy with two non-
degenerate intervals supports a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Suppose that the partitional
strategy is such that [0; a), and [a; 1] for both senders. Suppose further that i = a. Dene
V (0; a)  F (a)U(y (0; a j 0; a) ; a; b) + (1  F (a))U(y (0; a j a; 1) ; a;b)
V (a; 1)  F (a)U(y (a; 1 j 0; a) ; a; b) + (1  F (a))U(y (a; 1 j a; 1) ; a;b):
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V (0; a) and V (a; 1) are the expected utility of sender i with i = a when his message
induces the receivers (random) action ySi(0; a), and ySi(a; 1), respectively. Dene A(a) 
V (0; a)  V (a; 1): The no arbitrage condition requires A(a) = 0. Clearly, A(1) < 0, since
the receivers action is, almost surely, either y(1; 1) or y(0; 1), and y(1; 1) > y(0; 1) implies
that the sender strictly prefers y(1; 1). On the the other hand, from Lemma 1 we know
that if a = 0, then A(0) > 0. Since A(a) is a continuous function, by the intermediate
value theorem there must be a 2 [0; 1] such that A(a) = 0. Moreover, A(0) 6= 0 and
A(1) 6= 0. Therefore, there exists a i = a 2 (0; 1) such that the sender with i = a is
indi¤erent between inducing ySi(0; a), and ySi(a; 1).
It remains to show that the partitional strategy [0; a); [a; 1] supports a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. Dene
B(i)  [F (a)U(y (0; a j 0; a) ; i; b) + (1  F (a))U(y (0; a j a; 1) ; i; b)]
 [F (a)U(y (a; 1 j 0; a) ; i; b) + (1  F (a))U(y (a; 1 j a; 1) ; i; b)]:
B(i) is an alternative representation of A(a) as a function of i given the partition
[0; a); [a1]. In other words, B(i) is the di¤erence between the expected utilities of the
sender with i when his message induces ySi(0; a) and ySi(a; 1), respectively. Note that
y (0; a j 0; a) < y (a; 1 j 0; a), and y (0; a j a; 1) < y (a; 1 j a; 1). Since U12 > 0, we
have
dB(i)
di
< 0: (20)
This serves as a sorting condition for every type of the sender. By denition B(a) = 0.
Thus (20) implies that the sender with i  a prefers to induce ySi(0; a), while the sender
with i > a prefers to induce ySi(a; 1). Hence, this partitional strategy is consistent with
the receivers belief. The receivers action is given by (19), which is clearly a best response
to the sender strategy described above. Hence, the partitional strategy with two non-
degenerate intervals [0; a); [a; 1] supports a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Corollary 1 By continuity, an informative equilibrium exists for b 2 [b; b+ ] at least for
some small .
The receiver strictly prefers the equilibrium with two intervals to the uninformative
equilibrium, since conditional on any combination of messages in the informative equi-
librium her expected utility is higher, as she can adjust her action accordingly. This,
unlike the uniform-quadratic setting we have seen above, does not necessarily apply to the
senders under this general setting. That is, although the expected utility the receiver ob-
tains per worker EU(y; i; 0) is higher in the informative equilibrium, this does not imply
that EU(y; i; b) is higher too.
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5.2 Overcondence/Garbling
We can show that the introduction of the garbling mechanism or an overcondent expert
also extends the possibility of information transmission in this general setting with a single
sender.4 Recall that in our model 1   p denotes the probability that the overcondent
sender observes pure noise, and 1  q denotes the probability that the message is sent by
the randomization device according to the ex ante distribution of the equilibrium message.
In both cases, letting  = p = q for convenience, the receivers best response given a
message indicating  2 [aj; aj+1) is
y(aj; aj+1) = argmax
y

R aj+1
aj
U(y; ; 0)f()dR aj+1
aj
f()d
+ (1  )
Z 1
0
U(y; ; 0)f()d: (21)
The notion of weak response to a message is captured by the sensitivity parameter : the
message is weighted at  < 1 to take into account the possibility that it is uninformative.
Suppose that b = b and that the senders type space is divided into [0]; (0; 1]: In both the
overcondence and garbling cases, given that the message reports  = 0 and the receiver
believes it, her best response is given by
yC = argmax
y
U(y; 0; 0) + (1  )
Z 1
0
U(y; ; 0)f()d:
Clearly we have y(0; 1)  yN > yC > y(0; 0): Since the sender is indi¤erent between y(0; 1)
and y(0; 0), by concavity of the utility function, the sender prefers yC to yN in the case of
overcondence (here the expected utility is calculated in terms of his wrong belief). Also
when the garbling mechanism is used,
U(yC ; 0;b) + (1  )U(y(0; 1); 0;b) > U(y(0; 0); 0;b) = U(y(0; 1); 0;b): (22)
The left hand side of the inequality in (22) represents the expected utility of the sender
with  = 0 when when he tell the truth. The right hand side is his expected utility when he
reports  2 (0; 1]. Hence, given the receivers belief, the sender with  = 0 strictly prefers
to reveal truthfully. Now a similar argument to the proof of Proposition 4 can be used to
show that there exists a partition [0; a]; (a; 1] for some a > 0 that supports a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium for any 0 <  < 1. Moreover, by continuity the equilibrium with two
intervals also exists for b 2 [b;b+ ].
Clearly the receiver is better o¤ in this equilibrium with two intervals than in the
uninformative equilibrium, since the expected utility conditional on any message she has
received is higher than the expected utility in the uninformative equilibrium. The same
4A similar result is independently obtained by Blume and Board (2006) in the context of garbling, but
the garbling mechanism they adopt could not be reinterpreted as overcondence.
28
reasoning does not apply to the sender in the general case, although both parties strictly
prefer an informative equilibrium in the uniform-quadratic setting.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided a simple yet rich framework to study communication with anonymity,
equal treatment, overcondent experts, garbling, and in public good provision. We have
shown that, with all the communication features of concern in this paper, the receiver
puts less weight on a message when making her decision compared with situations where
a single rational sender communicates directly with the receiver. In the uniform-quadratic
setting, we have characterized informative equilibria and demonstrated that weak response
to a message may change the structure of informative equilibria dramatically. In partic-
ular, there exists no fully revealing equilibrium even in the absence of individual conict
of interest, but there may exist a type of sender whose ideal action coincides with that
of the receiver (in expected terms) even in the presence of conict. The most informative
equilibrium may involve an innite number of intervals, although it is not fully revealing.
The structure of the most informative equilibrium is in stark contrast to that of CS, where
there are a nite number of intervals in the type space when there is a conict of interest
between communicating parties.
We have argued that various constraints on communication such as anonymity, equal
treatment, overcondence, and garbling may improve information transmission when the
level of conict is large.
To our knowledge, the framework we have developed above o¤ers the rst attempt
at the formal analysis of anonymity and overcondence in communication. Anonymity
has been an important concept in the social choice literature, but typically it refers to a
certain property in a social choice function rather than a characteristic of messages the
decision maker uses in choosing her action. By introducing anonymity into the standard
cheap talk model, we are able to illustrate the role of anonymity in the receivers decision
making and its consequences on information revelation. While the economic literature on
overcondence has been concerned mainly with its implication for markets, our focus is on
the credibility of advice from an overcondent expert.
Our paper also sheds new light on communication in public good provision. Much if the
literature has focused on situations in which each agent determines his own contribution
under a certain provision rule. In contrast, our model is particularly relevant to commu-
nication in public good provision where a decision maker, who cannot ex ante commit to
a provision rule, communicates with the members of a group and chooses the quality or
quantity of a public good at the same or no cost (contribution) for each of them. We
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have demonstrated that, when there is a personal bliss point (ideal action) in the agents
preference, exaggeration will be an important issue.
It has already been known since Myerson (1986) and Forges (1986) that garbling can
improve welfare, and more recently Krishna and Morgan (2004), Blume and Board (2006)
and others have proposed garbling devices to achieve Pareto improvement. This paper
contributes to the literature too, by providing a systematic analysis of a well-dened gar-
bling mechanism and by illustrating how it potentially changes the structure of informative
equilibria, even with a very small possibility of garbling.
7 Appendix I: Rational Sender with p < 1
Let Es[ j m] be the expected value of  conditional on the message, given that the sender
observes the true . As in the main text the receivers best response is given by
yR(m) = pEs[ j m] + (1  p)1
2
:
On the other hand the senders ideal action given that he has observed  is, as he recognizes
p correctly,
yS() = p + (1  p)1
2
+ b. (23)
Note that since
yR() = p + (1  p)1
2
,
both partiesideal actions for  never coincide if b > 0. This implies that, like CS, there
does not exist a truth-telling type and the sender has incentives to overstate only.
Let us nd the equilibrium partitions. Since the utility function is symmetric with
respect to y, for (A) to be true, it must be that the action that the sender with observed
type aj wishes to induce, paj + (1   p)12 + b, lies exactly halfway in between these two
actions induced by two di¤erent messages
paj + (1  p)1
2
+ b =
y(aj 1; aj) + y(aj; aj+1)
2
= p

aj 1 + aj
4
+
aj + aj+1
4

+ (1  p)1
2
: (24)
From (24) we obtain a second-order di¤erence equation
aj+1   2aj + aj 1 = 4b
p
:
Solving for a0 = 0 and a2 = 1 we obtain
a1 =
1
2
  2b
p
;
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which gives the equilibrium partition with two intervals: a0 = 0; a1 = 12   2bp ; a2 = 1. Thus
this equilibrium can be supported if a1  0 or
b  p
4
= b:
Hence, the largest bias that allows information transmission to occur is decreasing in p. In
contrast, if the sender is overcondent b is increasing in p, as we have seen in (17).
8 Appendix II: Proof of Proposition 3
8.1 Preliminaries
Before we prove the Proposition, we provide some useful lemmas and discuss how we con-
struct the main proof. Let us call a sequence fa0; a1; :::; aJg that satises (A) a "solution"
to (A). The monotonicity condition (M) in CS requires that, for given  and b, if we have
two solutions a+ and a++ with a+0 = a
++
0 and a
+
1 > a
++
1 , then a
+
j > a
++
j for all j = 2; 3; :::
In other words, (M) says that starting from a0, all solutions to (A) must move up or down
together.
Lemma 2 Any solutions to (A) satises the monotonicity condition (M) in CS
Proof. Explicitly solving (12), which is replicated below
aj+1   (4  2)aj + aj 1 = 4b+ 2   2; (25)
we obtain
aj =
a1   ^
 
2  2   2p1  
4
p
1  

2   + 2p1  

j
+
 a1   ^
 
2  2 + 2p1  
4
p
1  

2     2p1  

j
+ ^;
where ^  1
2
  b
1  . Since we have
daj
da1
=

4
p
1  
"
2   + 2p1  

j
 

2     2p1  

j#
> 0;
all solutions to (A) must move up or down together. This is the denition of condition
(M) in CS.
Since our uniform-quadratic setting with the sensitivity parameter  satises (M), we
can resort to various useful results provided by CS. In particular, the equilibrium partition
with size J is unique.
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In order to show that the players expected utility is higher in an equilibrium with
more intervals, CS deform the partition with J intervals to that with J + 1 intervals,
by continuously increasing the players expected utility throughout the deformation. We
follow this method, but we need to proceed by two step deformation, rather than one.
Let a(J) be the equilibrium partition of size J . We show that a(J) can be deformed to
a(J + 1) by two steps, continuously increasing the playersexpected utility in each step.
Here we consider the case where the truth-telling type exists, or ^ 2 [0; 1]. The case where
^ =2 [0; 1] can be proven similarly, by using the rst deformation only.
Let the sub-partition of a(J) equal or below ^ be a(J)  (a0(J); a2(J); :::; aK(J)) where
a0(J) = 0. Also, suppose that aK(J) is closer to ^ than aK+1(J) is, in other words,
^   aK(J) < aK+1(J)  ^. In the following we proceed in two steps:
1. We x aK(J) and make the sub-partition (aK(J); aK+1(J); :::; aJ(J)) deform contin-
uously to (aK(J); aK+1(J + 1); aK+2(J + 1); :::; aJ+1(J + 1)), increasing the expected
utility.
2. We make the sub-partition (a0(J); a1(J):::; aK(J)) deform continuously to (a0(J +
1); a2(J + 1); :::; aK(J + 1)), increasing the expected utility.
 If ^ aK(J)  aK+1(J) ^ then the rst step deforms (a0(J); a1(J); :::; aK(J); aK+1(J))
to (a0(J+1); a1(J+1); :::; aK+1(J+1); aK+1(J)) while xing aK+1(J), and the second
step deforms (aK+1(J); aK+2(J); :::; aJ(J)) to (aK+2(J +1); aK+3(J +1); :::; aJ+1(J +
1)). Except for this the same method and result as the case where ^   aK(J) <
aK+1(J)  ^ apply.
Lemma 3 If a(J) and a(J+1) are two equilibrium partitions for the same values of b and
, then aj 1(J) < aj(J + 1) < aj(J):
Proof. See Lemma 3 (p.1446) in CS. The proof follows directly from (M).
The rst step of deformation is carried out as follows. Let (axK ; a
x
K+1; :::; a
x
j ; :::; a
x
J+1) be
the sub-partition that satises (A) for all j = K +1; K +2; :::; J with axK = aK(J), a
x
J = x
and axJ+1 = 1. If x = aJ 1(J) then a
x
K+1 = a
x
K = aK(J): If x = aJ(J + 1) then we have
(aK(J); aK+1(J+1); :::; aJ(J+1)), where (A) is satised for all j = K+2; K+3; :::; J . We
are going show that, if x 2 [aJ 1(J); aJ(J + 1)], which is again a non-degenerate interval
by Lemma 3, then the senders expected utility is strictly increasing in x.
In the second step, let (az0; a
z
1; :::; a
z
j ; :::; a
z
K) be the sub-partition that satises (A) for
j = 1; 2; :::; K   1; with az0 = 0 and azK = z. If z = aK(J) then azj = aj(J) for all
j = 0; 1; :::; K. If z = aK(J + 1) then azj = aj(J + 1) for all j = 0; 1; :::; K:. We will show
that when z 2 [aK(J + 1); aK(J)], which is again a non-degenerate interval by Lemma 3,
the senders expected utility is strictly decreasing in z.
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Lemma 4 Suppose that fa0; a1; :::; aj; :::; aJg is a solution to (A). Then for all j = 1; 2; :::; J 
1 if aj > (<)^ then aj   aj 1 < aj+1   aj (aj   aj 1 > aj+1   aj). If aj = ^ then
aj   aj 1 = aj+1   aj:
Proof. The sequences that satisfy (A) are described by (12). Rearranging (12) we have
(aj+1   aj)  (aj   aj 1) = 4aj + 4b+ 2   2

  4aj: (26)
The left hand side (aj+1   aj)  (aj   aj 1) = 0 if
4aj + 4b+ 2   2

  4aj = 0)
4aj(1  ) =  4b  2 + 2)
aj =
1
2
  b
1    ^:
Since the right hand side of (26) is increasing in aj, if aj > ^ then (aj+1 aj) (aj aj 1) > 0;
and if aj < ^ then (aj+1   aj)  (aj   aj 1) < 0.
The above lemma says that an interval [aj+1; aj) is longer (shorter) than the previous
interval [aj 1; aj) when aj > (<)^. The intuition is captured in Figure 2. The following
Lemma is similar but cannot be implied by Lemma 4. Since by denition axK and a
z
K+1 are
xed throughout the respective deformation, (A) is not satised at aj = axK+1 or aj = a
z
K .
Lemma 5 axK+1   axK < axK+2   axK+1 and azK   azK 1 > azK+1   azK .
Proof. From Lemma 4 we have axK+1   ~aK < axK+2   axK+1 where ~aK is dened such that
(aj 1 = ~aK ; aj = axK+1; aj+1 = a
x
K+2) satises (12). Since aK(J + 1) < ~aK < aK(J) = a
x
K
from Lemma 3, we have axK+1 axK < axK+2 axK+1. This proves the rst part of the Lemma.
Similarly we have azK   azK 1  aK+1   azK where aK+1 is dened such that (aj 1 =
azK 1; aj = a
z
K ; aj+1 = aK+1) satises (12). Lemma 3 implies a
z
K+1 = aK+1(J+1) < aK+1 <
aK+1(J). Hence we have azK   azK 1 > azK+1   azK .
8.2 Anonymous Communication/Equal Treatment
8.2.1 Sender
The receivers action from a senders viewpoint is a random variable, and since the utility
functions are quadratic, we can separate the expected value terms and the variance terms.
The senders utility in this separated form conditional of his report is given by
E
 (yi(mi)  (i + b))2
=  var(yi(mi))  (Eyi(mi))2 + 2(i + b)Eyi(mi)  (i + b)2
=  var(yi)  (Eyi(mi)  (i + b))2; (27)
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where
Eyi(mi) = E [i j mi] + n  1
2n
:
The variance term is independent of the senders message since the randomness is caused
by the other sendersmessages unobservable to the sender. Let the sender is expected type
given his message be a^i. Since the receivers action is the mean of all posterior expected
types, from sender is viewpoint
var(yi) = var
 
1
n
 X
l 6=i
a^l + a^i
!!
=
1
n2
var
 X
l 6=i
a^l + a^i
!
=
n  1
n2
var(a^);
where var(a^) is the variance of the expected type of a sender given his equilibrium strat-
egy. The last equality follows from independent type distributions and symmetric sender
strategies.
The expected utility for the rst part of deformation is given by
EUS   
KX
j=1
Z axj
axj 1

aj 1 + aj
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  
2
d
 
J+1X
j=K+1
Z axj
axj 1

axj 1 + a
x
j
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  
2
d
 n  1
n2
KX
j=1

(aj   aj 1)(aj 1 + aj)2
4
  1
4

 n  1
n2
J+1X
j=K+1

(axj   axj 1)(axj 1 + axj )2
4
  1
4

:
It follows that
dEUS
dx

J+1X
j=K+1
daxj
dx
(
 

axj 1 + a
x
j
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  axj
2
+

axj + a
x
j+1
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  axj
2
  1
n
"Z axj
axj 1

axj 1 + a
x
j
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  

d +
Z axj+1
axj

axj + a
x
j+1
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  

d
#
 

n  1
2n2
(axj+1)
2   (axj 1)2 +
(axj 1 + a
x
j )
2   (axj + axj+1)2
2

:
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We have5
 

axj 1 + a
x
j
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  axj
2
+

axj + a
x
j+1
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  axj
2
=
n  1
2n2
(axj+1   axj 1)(1  2axj ) 
b(axj+1   axj 1)
n
+
(axj+1   axj 1)(axj 1   2axj + axj+1)
4n2
:
Also the second line,
  1
n
"Z axj
axj 1

axj 1 + a
x
j
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  

d +
Z axj
axj 1

axj + a
x
j+1
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  

d
#
=
n  1
2n2

(axj+1)
2   (axj 1)2   (axj+1   axj 1)

+
b(axj+1   axj 1)
n
:
Hence,
 

axj 1 + a
x
j
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  axj
2
+

axj + a
x
j+1
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  axj
2
  1
n
"Z axj
axj 1

axj 1 + a
x
j
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  

d +
Z axj+1
axj

axj + a
x
j+1
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  

d
#
 n  1
2n2

(axj+1)
2   (axj 1)2 +
(axj 1 + a
x
j )
2   (axj + axj+1)2
2

=
axj+1   axj 1
2n

axj 1   2axj + axj+1
2

> 0:
The inequality follows because from Lemmas 4 and 5, we have aj   aj 1 < aj+1   aj )
axj 1   2axj + axj+1 > 0 for all j = K + 1; K + 2; :::; J . We have
daxj
dx
> 0 by (M). It follows
that
dEUS
dx

J+1X
j=K+1
daxj
dx

axj+1   axj 1
2n

axj 1   2axj + axj+1
2

> 0:
5For j = K + 2;K + 3; :::; J   1 we can use the fact that axj satises (A) or
 

axj 1 + a
x
j
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  axj
2
+

axj + a
x
j+1
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  axj
2
= 0
to simplify the calculation, alhtough later exposition will become more complex because this does not
apply to j = K.
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Let us look at the second part of deformation
dEUS
dz

KX
j=1
dazj
dz
(
 

azj 1 + a
z
j
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  azj
2
+

azj + a
z
j+1
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  azj
2
  1
n
"Z azj
azj 1

azj 1 + a
z
j
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  

d +
Z azj+1
azj

azj + a
z
j+1
2n
+
n  1
2n
  b  

d
#
 n  1
2n2

(azj+1)
2   (azj 1)2  
(azj 1 + a
z
j)
2   (azj + azj+1)2
2

=
KX
j=1
dazj
dz

azj+1   azj 1
2n

azj 1   2azj + azj+1
2

< 0:
The inequality follows because
dazj
dz
> 0 by (M), and from a0; a1; :::; aK  ^ and Lemmas 4
and 5 we have aj   aj 1 > aj+1   aj ) azj 1   2azj + azj+1 < 0 for all j = 1; 2; :::; K.
Since we have completed the deformation from a(J) to a(J + 1) by two steps while
increasing the expected utility, we conclude that the senders expected utility is higher in
an equilibrium with more intervals.
8.2.2 Receiver
Since the receivers utility is the sum of the sendersutilities without bias (b = 0), we can
apply the above result for a senders expected utility directly to show that the receivers
expected utility is higher with an equilibrium with more intervals.
8.3 Garbling
8.3.1 Sender
The senders expected utility for the rst part of deformation is given by
EUS   q
"
KX
j=1
Z aj
aj 1

q
aj 1 + aj
2
+
1  q
2
  b  
2
d
+
J+1X
j=K+1
Z axj
axj 1

q
axj 1 + a
x
j
2
+
1  q
2
  b  
2
d
#
 (1  q)
"
KX
j=1
(aj   aj 1)
Z 1
0

q
aj 1 + aj
2
+
1  q
2
  b  
2
d
+
J+1X
j=K+1
(axj   axj 1)
Z 1
0

q
axj 1 + a
x
j
2
+
1  q
2
  b  
2
d
#
:
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It follows that
dEUS
dx

J+1X
j=K+1
daxj
dx
(
 q
"
q
axj 1 + a
x
j
2
+
1  q
2
  b  axj
2
 

q
axj + a
x
j+1
2
+
1  q
2
  b  axj
2
+
Z axj
axj 1

q
axj 1 + a
x
j
2
+
1  q
2
  b  

d +
Z axj+1
axj

q
axj + a
x
j+1
2
+
1  q
2
  b  

d
#
  (1  q)
"Z 1
0

q
axj 1 + a
x
j
2
+
1  q
2
  b  
2
d  
Z 1
0

q
axj + a
x
j+1
2
+
1  q
2
  b  
2
d
+ q(axj   axj 1)
Z 1
0

q
axj 1 + a
x
j
2
+
1  q
2
  b  

d
+q(axj+1   axj )
Z 1
0

q
axj + a
x
j+1
2
+
1  q
2
  b  

d

=
J+1X
j=K+1
daxj
dx
q(axj+1   axj 1)
4

4b(1  q) + (2  3q + 2q2)(axj 1 + axj+1   1)  q(2axj   1)

:
Since
daxj
dx
> 0, the sign of dEU
S
dx
depends on the sign of the terms in the square brackets.
For all j = K;K + 1; :::; J ,
4b(1  q) + (2  3q + 2q2)(axj 1 + axj+1   1)  q(2axj   1)
> 4b(1  q) + (2  4q + 2q2)(axj 1 + axj+1   1)
= 4b(1  q) + 2(1  q)2(axj 1 + axj+1   1)
> 4b(1  q) + 2(1  q)2

1
2
  b
1  q +
1
2
  b
1  q   1

= 4b(1  q)  4b(1  q) = 0: (28)
The rst inequality follows since from Lemmas 4 and 5 we have aj   aj 1 < aj+1   aj )
axj 1+a
x
j+1 1 > 2axj  1. The second inequality follows from axK+2; :::; axJ+1 > ^  1=2  b1 q
and from the assumption that ^  aK(J)  aK+1(J)   ^, which implies axK + axK+2  2^
where axK = aK(J) and a
x
K+2  aK+1(J): (Note that axK+2 = aK+1(J) when x = aJ 1(J):)
Hence we have dEU
S
dx
> 0; so EUS is increasing throughout the rst part of deformation.
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Let us look at the second part of deformation.
dEUS
dz

KX
j=1
dazj
dz
(
 q
"
q
azj 1 + a
z
j
2
+
1  q
2
  b  azj
2
 

q
azj + a
z
j+1
2
+
1  q
2
  b  azj
2
+
Z azj
azj 1

q
azj 1 + a
z
j
2
+
1  q
2
  b  

d +
Z azj+1
azj

q
azj + a
z
j+1
2
+
1  q
2
  b  

d
#
  (1  q)
"Z 1
0

q
azj 1 + a
z
j
2
+
1  q
2
  b  
2
d  
Z 1
0

q
azj + a
z
j+1
2
+
1  q
2
  b  
2
d
+ q(azj   azj 1)
Z 1
0

q
azj 1 + a
z
j
2
+
1  q
2
  b  

d
+q(azj+1   azj)
Z 1
0

q
azj + a
z
j+1
2
+
1  q
2
  b  

d

=
KX
j=1
dazj
dz
q(azj+1   azj 1)
4

4b(1  q) + (2  3q + 2q2)(azj 1 + azj+1   1)  q(2azj   1)

:
We have
dazj
dz
> 0 from (M). The terms in the square brackets are negative since, for all
j = 1; 2; :::; K.
4b(1  q) + (2  3q + 2q2)(azj 1 + azj+1   1)  q(2azj   1)
< 4b(1  q) + (2  4q + 2q2)(2azj   1)
= 4b(1  q) + 2(1  q)2(2azj   1)
< 4b(1  q) + 2(1  q)2

1
2
  b
1  q +
1
2
  b
1  q   1

= 4b(1  q)  4(1  q)b = 0: (29)
The rst inequality follows because Lemmas 4 and 5 imply aj   aj 1 > aj+1   aj )
axj 1 + a
x
j+1   1 < 2axj   1. The second inequality follows from az0; az1:::; azK < ^  1=2  
b
1 q . Therefore, EU
S is increasing throughout the second part of deformation for which z
decreases from aK(J) to aK(J + 1).
Since we have completed the deformation from a(J) to a(J + 1) by two steps while
increasing the expected utility, we conclude that the senders expected utility is higher in
an equilibrium with more intervals.
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8.3.2 Receiver
Following the above two-step deformation, the receivers expected utility for the rst part
of deformation is given by
EUR   q
"
KX
j=1
Z a0j
a0j 1

q
aj 1 + aj
2
+
1  q
2
  
2
d
+
J+1X
j=K+1
Z axj
axj 1

q
axj 1 + a
x
j
2
+
1  q
2
  
2
d
#
 (1  q)
"
KX
j=1
(aj   aj 1)
Z 1
0

q
aj 1 + aj
2
+
1  q
2
  
2
d
+
J+1X
j=K+1
(axj   axj 1)
Z 1
0

q
axj 1 + a
x
j
2
+
1  q
2
  
2
d
#
:
Note that the expected utility is identical to that of the sender, except that b = 0 for the
receiver. Therefore, in order to show that the receivers expected utility is higher in an
equilibrium with more intervals, we can directly apply the the argument we have used for
the senders expected utility.
8.4 Overcondent Expert
8.4.1 Sender
If we consider that the expected utility is calculated according to his (wrong) belief that
his observation of his type is always correct, his expected utility is given by
EUS   
KX
j=1
Z aj
aj 1

p
aj 1 + aj
2
+
1  p
2
  b  
2
d
 
J+1X
j=K+1
Z aj
aj 1

p
aj 1 + aj
2
+
1  p
2
  b  
2
d:
Note that this expression is the same as the senders expected utility with garbling, except
that the variance term is absent and that the weight on the message is given here by p
rather than q. Therefore, we can directly apply the proof for the garbling case (without
the variance term) and prove that the expected utility is strictly increasing in the number
of the intervals.
If we assume that the senders expected utility is the expected value of the actual
realization of payo¤, the expected utility is identical to that with garbling except that the
sensitivity parameter is p rather than q. Again, we can directly apply the proof for the
garbling case.
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8.4.2 Receiver
The receivers expected utility is identical to that with garbling except that the sensitivity
parameter is p rather than q. We can directly apply the proof for the garbling case.
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